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- Spying Between Friends
-
- March 16, 1987
-
- The Pollard verdict causes a wave of unease in Israel
-
- No one in Israel was mincing words. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin
- called it a "real disaster, a real wound in Israeli-U.S. relations."
- Foreign Minister Shimon Peres admitted that Israel had made a
- "regretful mistake." Declared former Foreign Minister Abba Eban:
- "This is the most difficult moment in the history of Israel's
- international relations, especially because the wrongdoing was done
- here."
-
- The disaster, the wound, the mistake, the wrongdoing turned on the
- case of Jonathan Jay Pollard, 32, an American naval intelligence
- analyst, who was given a sentence of life imprisonment last week for
- spying in Israel's behalf against the U.S. Pollard's wife Anne, 26,
- was condemned to prison for five years. In Israel this final
- denouement of the Pollard affair precipitated a painful self-
- examination of intelligence operations as well as worried about the
- future of the special relationship between Israel and the U.S.
-
- The saga of Jonathan Pollard the spy began in the spring of 1984,
- when he first met Colonel Aviam Sella, one of Israel's best-known
- younger military officers, through a mutual acquaintance. The
- Israeli colonel at the time was taking a course in computer
- engineering at New York University. Pollard offered to spy for the
- Israelis and soon began to steal documents from the Naval
- Investigative Service in Suitland, Md., where he worked. On a trip
- to Paris that fall, he met Yosef Yagur, scientific attache at the
- Israeli consulate in New York City, and Rafi Eitan, the former deputy
- head of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency. Eitan was running
- the small, little-known intelligence unit to which Pollard was
- passing information. Month after month, Pollard delivered highly
- classified documents to the apartment of Irit Erb, a secretary at the
- Israeli embassy in Washington, where the material was photocopied.
-
- In November 1985, co-workers finally noted that Pollard was taking
- classified papers home with him and informed the FBI. During the
- ensuing interrogation, Pollard phoned his wife and alerted her to
- what was happening by using the code word "cactus." Anne Henderson-
- Pollard then warned the Israelis of the impending danger and tried
- unsuccessfully to dispose of a suitcase full of classified documents.
- A few days later the Pollards drove to the Israel-embassy compound,
- where they apparently hoped to gain refuge and perhaps political
- asylum. But the Israelis, realizing the Pollards were being followed
- by the FBI, turned them away, and the pair were soon arrested.
- Sella, Yagur and Erb quietly slipped out of the country.
-
- In a world in which spying between friendly nations is not uncommon,
- what was unusual about the Pollard case? For one thing, the sheer
- volume of the intelligence material Pollard stole and turned over to
- Israel. According tot he Government, if all these documents were
- stacked in one place, the resulting mountain of papers would be 6 ft.
- wide, 6 ft. deep and 10 ft. high. Furthermore, the material stolen
- covered a wide range of highly sensitive subjects, from nuclear
- facilities in Iraq and Pakistan to Soviet surface-to-air-missile
- capabilities to the antiaircraft defense around the Palestine
- Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis. Israel later staged an
- air attack on the P.L.O. buildings, killing at least 60 Tunisians
- and Palestinians. Declared Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger: "It
- is difficult for me to conceive of a greater harm to national
- security than that caused by the defendant in view of the breadth,
- the critical importance of the U.S. and the high sensitivity of the
- information he sold to Israel."
-
- Throughout the case, Pollard's attorneys attempted to portray their
- client as an idealistic Zionist whose actions were based on his
- concern for Israel's security and survival. The prosecution,
- however, pointed out that Pollard had received some $50,000 for his
- espionage and, had he remained in the service of the Israelis for an
- additional nine years, would have wound up with at least $500,000.
-
- The defense also based its case on the contention that spying for
- Israel, a close U.S. ally, was fundamentally different from spying
- for, say, the Soviet Union and that nobody could prove Pollard's
- actions had actually harmed his country. The prosecution took a dim
- view of that argument. Explains John Martin, the Justice
- Department's chief of internal security: "God forbid that the day
- should come when we would have the burden of showing that not only
- did a spy give up information on nuclear weapons but that those
- weapons were used under hostile conditions."
-
- Outside the courtroom, Pollard and his wife were making statements
- that were as legally compromising as anything in their testimony. In
- a letter published in the Jerusalem Post, Pollard wrote of his
- "absolute obligation" to spy for Israel and alluded to circumstances
- in which a person might be forced to use "situational ethics" as a
- guide to his conduct. His wife, interviewed on CBS's 60 Minutes,
- spoke of the responsibility of American Jews to aid Israel. Said
- she: "I feel my husband and i did what we were expected to do, what
- our moral obligation was as Jews [and] as human beings, and I have
- no regrets about that."
-
- In an unusually emotional courtroom finale, the Pollards pleaded
- desperately for clemency. But despite the fact that Pollard entered
- a guilty plea last summer and since then had been cooperating to some
- degree with the Government in fingering the Israel officials with
- whom he had worked, U.S. District Court Judge Aubrey Robinson Jr.
- concluded that Pollard's crime merited the harshest punishment the
- court could impose.
-
- When the case first broke in late 1985, the U.S. was not yet aware of
- the seriousness of the espionage, and accepted Israeli promises of
- assistance in settling the affair. The Justice Department wanted to
- proceed with the trial of Pollard and the indictment of his Israeli
- contact, but the State Department argued that American relations with
- Israel should receive primary consideration. Secretary of State
- George Shultz spoke of Israeli "cooperation" on the case, and State
- Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer headed a delegation that was
- sent to Israel to collect the documents Pollard had stolen.
- According to court records, Sofaer returned with a mere 163 documents
- out of the thousands that had been taken.
-
- Gradually the Administration's anger increased as it realized the
- gravity of the security breach and the difficulty of ascertaining
- exactly what had happened. Moreover, though Jerusalem still insisted
- that Pollard had been part of a "rogue" spy team, Washington began to
- suspect that those who had worked with him were actually being
- rewarded. Eitan, who had headed the Pollard operation, was appointed
- board chairman of Israel Chemicals, a large government-owned company.
- Two weeks ago Colonel Sella was named commander of one of Israel's
- most important air bases, Tel Nof.
-
- After learning of Sella's promotion, the Administration canceled a
- joint American-Israeli air-force training course and put Tel Nof off
- limits to U.S. officers and other officials. In addition, the
- Administration threatened to suspend its policy of military
- cooperation with the Israeli air force unless Sella's appointment was
- rescinded. Last week a federal grand jury in Washington issued an
- indictment against Sella.
-
- Israel's Foreign Minister Peres is undoubtedly right in his judgment
- that the "body of relations" between the U.S. and Israel is strong
- and can withstand the shock of the Pollard affair. But the case
- raises troubling questions about the proprieties of espionage between
- allies. Says the Justice Department's Martin: "Even as friendly as
- you are, there are times when national interests are different. It
- is up to policymakers to decide who gets what. We can't have
- individuals secretly providing information to any friend or foe."
-
- --By William E. Smith.
- Reported by Ron Ben-Yishai/Jerusalem and Anne Constable/Washington